



Interpersonal distance adjustments after interactions with a generous and 
selfish trustee during a repeated trust game 
 
Lisa A. Rosenbergera*, Michael Naefb, Christoph Eiseneggera, and Claus Lamma,c* 
 
a Neuropsychopharmacology and Biopsychology Unit, Department of Basic Psychological 
Research and Research Methods, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Austria.  
b Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University 
of London, Egham, TW20 0EX, United Kingdom. 
c Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Unit, Department of Basic Psychological 
Research and Research Methods, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Austria 
* To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email: lisa.anna.rosenberger@univie.ac.at or 















How physically close to an individual we choose to stand—our interpersonal distance 
preference—is thought to closely reflect the trust placed in the individual. However, the 
exact relationship between interpersonal distance and trust is not well understood and the 
causal effects of trust on interpersonal distance has not yet been demonstrated and 
quantified experimentally. Here, we induced trust (vs distrust) in an interaction partner 
through generous (vs selfish) monetary transactions in a repeated trust game. Subjects’ 
investments in, experienced trust in, and expected back-transfers from the two interaction 
partners indicated that they learned to distrust more the selfish (vs generous) interaction 
partner. Further, across two experiments, using a pre-post design in which interpersonal 
distance preferences were measured before and after the trust game, preferred reflective 
and reflexive interpersonal distance from the selfish interaction partner increased, whereas 
interactions with the generous partner did not change these preferences. Importantly, the 
post-game distance was associated with subjects’ experienced trust in the selfish interaction 
partner, and not their monetary decisions made during the game. These findings are a 
starting point for our understanding of how interactions with untrusted others can be 
successful. We speculate that an increased interpersonal distance might be accompanied by 
an increased psychological distance (e.g. through impersonal communication), which might 
help prevent a break-down of an interaction with a distrusted partner. 
 
Keywords 





We can intuitively imagine standing further away from someone we trust less (vs 
more) during a conversation. This preferred distance from another person is a largely 
automatic behavior (Hall, 1966) that co-determines how successfully we navigate everyday 
social interactions. Too close a distance feels intrusive and threatening, yet too far a distance 
feels standoffish and distrusting (Lloyd, 2009). Inappropriate interpersonal distances may 
also hamper our interactions, because they implicitly signal the relationship type and quality 
we perceive ourselves having with the person (Hall, 1966), and are closely linked to how 
much we trust them (Jourard & Friedman, 1970; Skotko & Langmeyer, 1977; Wheeless & 
Grotz, 1977). Surprisingly, there is little research on the exact nature of the relationship 
between these two phenomena; To our knowledge it has only been described that 
interpersonal distance causally affects how much we trust others (Bryan, Perona, & Adolphs, 
2012). However, the perhaps more intuitive causal effects of trust on interpersonal distance 
have not yet been studied. Understanding the directionality of the association between 
these two concepts is integral for determining how both work alone and in combination to 
affect social interactions and decision-making. Hence, in two experiments, we tested 
whether (dis-)trusting another person can cause healthy subjects to adjust their preferred 
interpersonal distance from them. 
The distance we stand from interaction partner influences our trust in them, with 
uncomfortably close or wide distances detrimental to trust. For example, even though a 
close distance is associated with enhanced self-disclosure (Jourard & Friedman, 1970; Skotko 
& Langmeyer, 1977) (an indirect measure of trust (Wheeless & Grotz, 1977)), too close a 
distance instead decreases trust. When an interaction partner stands within one’s personal 
space (i.e., the area around a person which causes discomfort when intruded; (Hayduk, 
1983)), the amount of money entrusted to them and the extent to which they are perceived 
as trustworthy decreases (Bryan et al., 2012). Running in the opposite causal direction, there 
is also evidence—albeit somewhat indirect—that trust impacts interpersonal distance. For 
instance, when observing an interaction where a cartoon agent’s actions have a larger (vs 
smaller) effect on another cartoon agent´s outcome, the physical distance between the two 
is perceived to be smaller (Shao, Yin, Ji, Yang, & Song, 2020). Thus, the quality of the 




experiences, such as joint book reading or Lego play, have been shown to decrease the 
distance to the interaction partners (Candini et al., 2017; Gessaroli, Santelli, di Pellegrino, & 
Frassinetti, 2013). Negative experiences, such as an aggressive conversation tone or angry 
facial expression, on the other hand, increase the distance one prefers between themselves 
and the interaction partner (Cartaud, Ruggiero, Ott, Iachini, & Coello, 2018; Ruggiero et al., 
2017; Vagnoni, Lewis, Tajadura-Jimenez, & Cardini, 2018). Further, manipulating the moral 
impression of an interaction partner affects the interpersonal distance one prefers to have 
from them (Iachini, Pagliaro, & Ruggiero, 2015; Pellencin, Paladino, Herbelin, & Serino, 
2018).  
To provide a direct test of whether trust impacts interpersonal distance, we made 
use of the Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In a typical setup of this game, two 
people, an investor and a trustee, aim to maximize their profits through monetary 
interactions. The amount of money the investor sends to the trustee signals the degree of 
trust in the trustee, who in turn can reciprocate that trust by making a back-transfer that is 
profitable for both of them. After multiple interactions, the investor learns to trust or 
distrust the trustee based on whether they reciprocate or exploit the trust placed in them 
(Chang, Doll, van 't Wout, Frank, & Sanfey, 2010). In this way, trust and distrust can be 
experimentally induced through interactions with a generous or a selfish trustee (Fett, 
Gromann, Giampietro, Shergill, & Krabbendam, 2012; Rosenberger et al., 2019). We 
predicted that, after interacting with them in the repeated trust game, subjects would prefer 
a smaller interpersonal distance from the generous trustee and larger interpersonal distance 
from the selfish trustee. In experiment 1, we measured static and reflective interpersonal 
distance with a paper and pencil task in which subjects indicate explicitly their preferred 
interpersonal distance from imagined interaction partners (Duke & Nowicki, 1972). This task 
measures a deliberative expression of comfortable interpersonal distance on a continuum, 
while holding stimulus appearance and context constant (Duke & Nowicki, 1972). In 
experiment 2, we measured more dynamic, reflexive interpersonal distance preferences 
with a digital stop-motion task (Perry, Rubinsten, Peled, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2013) in which 
subjects view an approaching interaction partner and indicate on the keyboard when the 
they should stop in their approach. This task is an extension of the paper and pencil 
measure, where the expression of comfortable interpersonal distance is substituted with a 




sensitive to distance requirements with interaction partners of different gender and age 
(Iachini et al., 2016), the digital version taps more into automatic approach – avoidance 
motivational preferences (Cohen, Perry, Mayseless, Kleinmintz, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2018; 




Two experiments were conducted using two independent student samples but 
involving similar task protocols. In both experiments, subjects first performed the 
interpersonal distance task, then played the repeated trust game, and then—immediately 
after the trust game—completed the interpersonal distance task again (see Figure 1). The 
experiments differed in the implementation of the interpersonal distance task (paper and 
pencil version used in experiment 1 and a digital task used in experiment 2). In experiment 1, 
54 students participated (34 female; mage = 25.02, SD = 7.55, range = 18 - 70) who were 
recruited through the university study recruitment website. In experiment 2, 55 students 
participated (35 female; mage = 27.43, SD = 8.83, range = 19 - 68) who were all recruited 
through the same university study recruitment website. The large age range is due to 
outliers in both samples. Removing the outliers did not change the results (data not shown). 
Therefore, no subjects were excluded from analyses. Subjects received a flat-fee 
reimbursement plus the money earned during the repeated trust game (exchange rate 
points to euro: 1:0.007). We collected data in a group laboratory where two to nine students 
participated simultaneously. A-priori sample size requirements were based on practical 
considerations of a minimum of 50 subjects during 7 group test sessions. Data analyses were 
performed after finishing data collection and thus did not influence the number of subjects. 
In the lab, dividers between the computers prevented subjects from seeing each other 
during testing. Verbal or non-verbal communication during testing was not allowed and—
subjects were warned—would lead to exclusion from the study. All subjects adhered to this 
rule and none had to be excluded during the test sessions. Before the start of the 
experiment, all subjects gave written informed consent. The study was conducted according 
to the declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the local university ethics committee. 




the characterization of trust development between interacting people. The test battery 
consisted of questionnaires (experiment 1 and 2: general trust, social value orientation; 
experiment 2 only: mood, behavioural motivation), implicit association tests (experiment 1: 
sequential priming task; experiment 2: affect misattribution procedure), and a measure of 
cue-controlled behaviour (only in experiment 2: pavlovian to instrumental transfer task). 
Results of these tasks are not reported, as these measures address different aspects of trust 
development than the one described in this paper. All measures, manipulations, and 
exclusions in the study are disclosed. 
Tasks 
Repeated Trust Game 
The repeated trust game was programmed in z-Tree (version 3.3.7 (Fischbacher, 
2007)) that allows for an easy implementation of multiplayer behavioural economic tasks. 
The task design and implementation was exactly the same in experiment 1 and experiment 
2. The script is deposited online (Anonymous, 2019). Subjects were instructed on paper and 
completed profit calculation questions as a comprehension check. In addition to the paper 
instructions, subjects played five practice rounds to familiarize themselves with the layout of 
the task. After the practice rounds, the experimenter ostensibly made a phone call to a 
laboratory in another building where the same study was thought to be taking place. During 
the phone call they audibly told the “other experimenter” that the subjects were ready to 
start the task. This belief induction was preceded by an explanation that the interaction 
partners for the task were seated in the other laboratory. The initial study invitation also 
stated that the experiments would take place in two separate laboratories simultaneously. 
In the repeated trust game two players entrust each other money over several 
rounds. Subjects always played in the role of investor with two pre-programmed trustees 
who ostensibly were fellow students participating in the same study in another laboratory. 
We chose ostensible partners in another room, so that subjects had no specific prior beliefs 
about them except that they were fellow students in a similar situation. All players were 
referred to with letters (subjects were player A, trustees were player B and C) and were 
represented with neutral avatars (see Figure 1A), with either horizontal or vertical stripes 
allowing to visually distinguish between them. Subjects played 52 rounds of the task, 




rounds with the same trustee). Subjects were unaware of the exact length of the task to 
prevent end-game effects. At the beginning of a round, both players were endowed with 10 
points. The subject started the round by making a variable investment (between 1 and 10 
points of their endowment) to the trustee, see Figure 1A. This investment got tripled by the 
experimenter and was then sent to the trustee. Next, the trustee made a variable back-
transfer (between 1 and (endowment + 3x investment) points) to the investor. This 
concluded a round and both players saw how many points they earned in this round.  
The back-transfers of the trustees were pre-programmed (Rosenberger et al., 2019). 
The generous trustee behaved trustworthy by making back-transfers that were either 100%, 
150%, or 200% of the investment. At the start of the task, there was an equal probability of 
these three back-transfers, but the probability of a back-transfer of 200% of the investment 
increased with 10% every time the subject increased her investment to the generous trustee 
in consecutive interactions. Thus, generous investments were rewarded with a higher 
probability of generous back-transfers. The selfish trustee behaved untrustworthy by making 
back-transfers that were either 100%, 75%, or 50% of the investment. At the start of the task 
there was an equal probability of these three back-transfers. The probability of a back-
transfer of 50% of the investment increased with 10% every time the subject increased their 
investment in consecutive interactions. Thus the subject´s generous investments got 
punished with a higher probability of selfish back-transfers. We fixed the back-transfers in 
the first four rounds to 100% of the investments (irrespective of trustee type) to induce the 
same prior beliefs about the back-transfers across subjects. The conceptualization of 
trustworthy and untrustworthy behaviour as respectively generous and selfish back-
transfers is based on neuro-economic definitions of trust and reciprocity. Here, trust is 
defined as sharing an exclusive source with a second person with the expectation that this 
will lead to a higher profit than not sharing this source. A trustee behaves trustworthy when 
they reciprocate this trust and thus increases the investor’s profit (Fehr & Camerer, 2007). In 
the context of a trust game this means that the investor is placing trust in the trustee by 
making an investment, with the expectation that the back-transfer from the trustee is 
profitable, thus higher than the amount invested (Berg et al., 1995). 
Every ten rounds subjects got prompted to rate the trustees. This prompt happened 




subjects had to rate how much they trust the trustee in this round on a visual analogue scale 
(VAS) ranging from 0 to 100, how high they expect the back-transfer to be (ranging from 1 to 
(10 + 3x the investment) in this round), and how certain they are about their back-transfer 
expectations (on a VAS from 0 to 100). Subjects were instructed beforehand that their 
ratings were not shared with the trustees and would therefore have no influence on the 
actual back-transfers. 
 
Figure 1. Task progression in experiment 1 and 2: interpersonal distance task, followed by a 
repeated trust game, which was followed by a repetition of the interpersonal distance task. 
A) Trial progression of repeated trust game. Subjects played for 52 rounds alternating 
between player B and player C (depicted with horizontally- and vertically-striped avatars). 




back-transfer expectations (screen 3), and the certainty about the back-transfer 
expectations (screen 4). B) Trial progression of digital interpersonal distance task. The figure 
in the middle represented the subject, and the other figure (player B, player C, mother, 
father, experimenter, best friend, unknown person) approached from the edge of the room. 
Distance between the figures is expressed in percentages ranging from 100% (approaching 
figure stands at the edge – left frame) to 0% (two figures colliding – right frame).  
Interpersonal distance task 
Subjects had to imagine they were standing in the middle of a round room, and a 
person would approach them from the side of the room (see Figure 1B). Subjects indicated 
where the approaching person should stand in the room (experiment 1), or stop (experiment 
2) for a comfortable conversation. Every trial, subjects indicated their comfortable 
interpersonal distance for a different approaching figure, with a total of 7 trials. Subjects 
were told that they were to imagine the approaching figures were—across the different 
trials—player B, player C, their mother, their father, the experimenter, their best friend, and 
an unknown person. The order of the approaching figures was randomized between 
subjects. The principle of the task was the same in experiment 1 and experiment 2, but the 
administration of the task differed. In experiment 1, a paper and pencil version of the task 
was administered (Duke & Nowicki, 1972). In this version, every trial was printed on a 
separate A4-sheet, where a round circle represented a round room (similar to left panel in 
Figure 1B). The figure in the middle of the room represented the subject, and the figure on 
the edge of the room the approaching person for whom the comfortable interpersonal 
distance had to be evaluated. A title identified the approaching figure. Subjects had to draw 
a cross where the approaching figure should stand for a comfortable distance. The sheets 
were stapled so that subjects could not lay them next to each other and use their distance 
from previous sheets as reference points. Distance from the figure in the middle of the room 
to the cross was measured in mm by two independent raters. Inter-rater correlation was 
high (rho = 0.98, p < .001).  
In experiment 2, a digital version of the task was administered (Perry et al., 2013) in 
E-Prime (version 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, 2015)). The script is deposited online 
(Anonymous, 2019). Here, subjects received three practice trials before the start of the task 




experiment 1, except that the figure at the edge of the room was animated and thus actually 
approached the figure in the middle. The subject could stop the approaching figure with a 
button click. If the subject failed to do so, the approaching figure would collide with the 
figure in the middle and a new trial would begin. The animation consisted of 49 frames, 
transitioning from the approaching figure standing at the edge of the room to colliding with 
the figure in the middle of the room. Each frame was displayed for 90 milliseconds. In this 
digital version, we measured the distance between the figure standing in the middle (i.e. the 
subject) and the approaching figure in number of frames.  
Statistical analyses 
We analysed the raw investment data and interpersonal distances with linear mixed 
models in R (version 3.5.0 (R Core Team, 2017)), with the lme4 package (version 1.1-21 
(Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015)). Linear mixed models are an extension of linear 
regressions. For this analysis individual subject data is not aggregated and individual 
variation can be specified in the model through the specification of subject specific (and 
possibly task item specific) intercepts and slopes. This improves the fit of the statistical 
model to the individual subject data, and reduces error variance in the data due to, for 
example, testing different individuals, or using different task items, and takes into account 
time effects (e.g. fatigue) due to repeated observations from the same individual. This 
increases the statistical test´s power, as well as the accuracy of the test results (e.g. Baayen, 
Davidson, & Bates, 2008).  
The test statistics (from Wald chi-square tests) for the main effects and interactions 
were calculated with orthogonal sum contrasts, and type 3 sum of squares from the car 
package (version 3.0-3 (Fox & Weisberg, 2011)). To decompose interactions with factorial 
variables, we performed post-hoc t-tests with the emmeans package with a multivariate 
correction for multiple comparisons (version 1.3.5.1 (Lenth, 2019)). Degrees of freedom for 
these post-hoc tests were approximated with the default Kenward-Roger method of the 
emmeans package. To decompose interactions with continuous variables, we interpreted 
the regression tables generated with the sjPlot package (version 2.6.3 (Lüdecke, 2018)). For 
this we switched to a treatment contrast of the factorial variables and changed their 
reference levels to obtain the appropriate slope statistics. The reported p-values for these 




the t-statistics as Wald z-statistics. Standardized beta-statistics for all post-hoc results were 
also obtained with a treatment contrast from the same regression tables from the sjPlot 
package. They serve as effect size estimates. Alpha for all analyses was set to 0.05. To 
compare the distances from the paper and pencil version with the digital version, we 
normalized data of each experiment by computing relative distances, which was done by 
dividing the measured distance by the maximum possible distance. The transformed 
interpersonal distance is expressed in percentage of the maximum distance. All the analysis 
steps described below were performed separately for the datasets of experiment 1 and 2. 
We performed a sensitivity power analysis in G*Power (version 3.1.9.4) for our main 
hypothesis that the interpersonal distance before compared to after the trust game differs 
between the two trustees. Based on a within-subject repeated measures ANOVA with 2 
groups, 2 measurements, two-tailed α = 0.05, power = 0.80, N = 55, repeated-measure 
correlation = 0.5, and nonsphericity correction =1, the minimum expected effect size is f = 
0.19. The data sets and analysis scripts are deposited online (Anonymous, 2019). Inter-
variable correlations of the mixed models are reported in the supplementary results Tables 6 
- 21. 
First, we evaluated the change in interpersonal distance resulting from the 
interactions in the trust game with the following linear mixed model:                   
                                                                       
with individual intercepts per subject. Approaching people was a factorial variable with the 
levels: generous trustee, selfish trustee, mother, father, experimenter, best friend, unknown 
person. Time point was also a factor with the levels: before trust game, after trust game. 
With post hoc t-tests we compared the relative distance change for each imagined 
approaching person (thus before vs. after the trust game), as well as the relative distance 
change between the generous and selfish trustee. 
Second, we analysed how well the subjects learned during the trust game, through 
their change in investments, trust ratings, back-transfer expectations, and certainty ratings. 
For this we ran four mixed models with the following structure:                      
                                                           . The 
outcome variables for the four models were investments, trust ratings, back-transfer 




well as two slopes for the trustee types per subject. Trustee type was a factor with the levels 
generous and selfish, and round number was a continuous variable ranging from 1 to 52. We 
report the round number beta statistics of the two trustees for an interpretation of the 
interactions. 
Third, to quantify the difference in learning for the two trustee types, we analysed 
absolute change in the trust game measures (investment, trust ratings, back-transfer 
expectations, certainty about back-transfer expectations) across the task. For this we 
calculated difference scores, subtracting the value of the measures in the first trust game 
round from those in the last round, separately for generous and selfish trustees. We 
compared these difference scores between trustees with paired t-tests. We also tested for 
too high initial back-transfer expectations by comparing the actual back-transfer and the 
back-transfer expectation in the first round with a one-sample t-test. Finally, we tested 
whether the total earnings at the end of the task differed between the trustees with a paired 
t-test. 
Fourth, to analyse associations between individual performance during the trust 
game and the change in interpersonal distance, we tested whether total earnings were 
associated with the change in interpersonal distance (subtracting pre trust game distance 
from post trust game distance) with the following linear mixed model:                 
                                                                  , which 
included a separate intercept for each subject. To increase interpretability of the beta 
coefficient we changed the scale of total earnings (original range: 173 to 468 points, new 
range 1.73 to 4.68 points) to be closer to the scale to the distance change variable (range: -
0.36 to 0.80), by dividing total earning by 100. In addition, we explored whether the 
subject´s investment and beliefs about the interaction partner during the final interaction 
was associated with the distance after the trust game with the following linear mixed model: 
                                                                        
                                                                             
                                                          
                                                          
                               , which included a separate intercept for each subject. 




the trustees were associated with the distance after the trust game, we ran the following 
linear mixed model:                                                  
                                                                         
                                                                             , 
which included a separate intercept for each subject. 
 
Results  
Experiment 1 - reflective interpersonal distance task 
Subjects adjusted the distance to the approaching people after (compared to before) the 
repeated trust game (approaching people x time point interaction: χ² (6) = 23.32, p < .001), 
see Figure 2A. Decomposing this interaction with post-hoc t-tests, we found that before the 
trust game interpersonal distance was not different for the two trustees, t(667.02) = 0.132, p 
> .99, std.b = 0.01 (95% CI = (-0.09, 0.11)), but it was different afterwards, t(667.02) = 6.405, 
p < .001, std.b = 0.31 (95% CI = (0.22, 0.41)). As hypothesized, the distance to the selfish 
trustee increased from an average of 25% (SE = 2%) before the trust game to an average of 
37% (SE = 4%) after the trust game, t(667.93) = -4.376, p < .001, std.b = 0.31 (95% CI = (0.17, 
0.45)). The post-game distance was largest from the selfish trustee compared to the other 
approaching people (see supplementary results Table 1). The post-game distance from the 
selfish trustee differed significantly from the post-game distance of all the other approaching 
people, except the unknown person (t(667) = 1.683, p = .860, std.b = -0.08, see also 
supplementary Table 2).  
The distance to the generous trustee did not decrease significantly, t(667.93) = 1.792, 
p = .413, std.b = -0.13 (95% CI = (-0.27, 0.01)), from an average of 24% (SE = 2%) to an 
average of 19% (SE = 1%) after the trust game, and thus did not confirm our hypothesis. The 
post-game distance from the generous trustee was not different from the post-game 
distance from the mother (t(667) = 1.511, p = .931, std.b = -0.07), father (t(667) = -0.188, p > 
.999, std.b = 0.01), and the experimenter (t(667) = -0.365, p > .999, std.b = 0.02). However, it 
was larger than the distance from the friend (t(667) = -3.627, p < .011, std.b = -0.18), and 
smaller than the distance from the unknown person (t(667) = -4.722, p < .001, std.b = 0.23), 




people, the interpersonal distances did not change when comparing before and after trust 
game measurements (see supplementary results Table 1).  
 
 
Figure 2. Trust and reflective interpersonal distance adaptation in experiment 1. A) Subjects 
increased their distance from the selfish trustee after the repeated trust game (RTG) in the 
interpersonal distance task. Dots represent individual data points, error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals (CI) adjusted for within-subject comparisons. B) Subjects learned to (dis-
)trust the trustees. They increased their investments to the generous trustee (solid line) and 
decreased them to the selfish trustee (dashed line) during 26 interactions with each trustee 
in the repeated trust game. Group data are smoothed with local regression (LOESS). Shaded 
areas around lines represent 95% CI. 
 
Experiment 2 – reflexive interpersonal distance task 
In experiment 2, interpersonal distance also changed after the repeated trust game, 
as indicated by an approaching people x time point interaction: χ²(6) = 51.43, p < .001, see 
supplementary results Figure 1A. Decomposing this interaction, we found that before the 
trust game, the interpersonal distance did not differ between the selfish and generous 
trustee, t(707) = -0.720, p > .999, std.b = 0.03 (95% CI = (-0.06, 0.13)), but afterwards it did, 
t(707) = 7.831, p < .001, std.b = 0.37 (95% CI = (0.28, 0.47)). The distance from the selfish 




std.b = 0.52 (95% CI = (0.39, 0.66)). As in experiment 1, the post-game distance was largest 
from the selfish trustee compared to the other approaching people (see supplementary 
results Table 3). The post-game distance from the selfish trustee differed significantly with 
all of the other approaching figures (see supplementary results Table 4).  
The distance decrease from the generous trustee was very small (from 22% (SE = 2%) 
to 19% (SE = 2%)) and not significant, t(708) = 0.841, p = .972, std.b = -0.06 (95% CI = (-0.19, 
0.08)). Similar to experiment 1, the post-game distance from the generous did not differ 
from the distance from the mother (t(707) = 2.244, p = .471, std.b = -0.11), the father (t(707) 
= 2.838, p = .134, std.b = -0.13), and the experimenter (t(707) = -0.30, p > .999, std.b = 0.00). 
However it was larger than the distance from the friend (t(707) = -4.651,p < .001, std.b = -
0.22), and smaller than the distance from the unknown person (t(707) = -3.774, p = .007, 
std.b = 0.18). As in experiment 1, the interpersonal distance did not change for the other 
approaching people when comparing before and after trust game interactions, see 
supplementary results Table 3.  
Even though the increase in interpersonal distance from the selfish trustee was larger 
in the 2nd experiment than in the 1st experiment, this difference was not significant, 
t(102.61) = -1.444, p = 0.152, std.b = 0.14 (95% CI = (-0.05, 0.33)). 
 
Experiment 1 - Repeated trust game 
At the beginning of the trust game, subjects overestimated the trustees back-
transfers, see Table 1: their back-transfer expectations were significantly more positive than 
the actual back-transfers they received from the two trustees, tgenerous(59) = -7.57, p < .001, d 
= -0.98, tselfish(59) = -6.87, p < .001, d = -0.89. In line with that, the first investments to both 
trustees were higher than the median endowment (= 5 points), and subjects expected higher 
back-transfers than their investments from both trustees.  
Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics of measures in the repeated trust game in experiment 1 
   first interaction last interaction 
 
generous 
trustee selfish trustee 
generous 




  m (SD) m (SD) m (SD) m (SD) 
investment in points 7.01 (2.88) 6.87 (3.08) 8.63 (2.57) 2.33 (2.83) 
trust rating in % 52.7 (25.43) 52.18 (25.77) 70.05 (26.99) 14.79 (27.34) 
back-transfer expectation in % 12.09 (6.95) 11.84 (7.17) 15.38 (5.98) 2 (2.89) 
difference (BT exp. – BT) in % -5.08 (4.93) -4.97 (4.89) 0.5 (4.47) -0.3 (2.26) 
certainty about BT exp. in % 32.19 (25.89) 32.92 (27.05) 63.67 (31.84) 69.79 (39.21) 
total earnings in points   408.53 (37.19) 238.37 (18.09) 
Note on abbreviations: m = mean, SD = standard deviation, BT = back-transfer, BT exp. = back-transfer expectations 
 
Over the rounds, subjects changed their investments to the generous trustee in a 
different manner than to the selfish trustee, trustee x round number interaction: χ² (1) = 
444.48, p < .001, see Figure 2B. Decomposing this interaction, we found that the 
investments to the generous trustee increased over the rounds, b = 0.04 (95% CI = (0.04, 
0.05)), p < .001, std.b = 0.17 (95% CI = (0.14, 0.20)), and decreased to the selfish trustee, b = -
0.07 (95% CI = (-0.08, -0.06)), p < .001, std.b = -0.28 (95% CI = (-0.31, -0.25)). The investment 
decrease with the selfish trustee was larger than the investment increase with the generous 
trustee, t(59) = -11.675, p < .001, std.b = 0.64 (95% CI = (0.53, 0.75)).  
Subjects also changed their back-transfer expectations about the generous trustee 
differently than about the selfish trustee over the rounds, trustee x round number 
interaction: χ² (1) = 158.06, p < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that they increased their back-
transfer expectations about the generous trustee (b = 0.10 (95% CI = (0.07, 0.12)), p < .001, 
std.b = 0.21 (95% CI = (0.15, 0.27))) and decreased them about the selfish trustee (b = - 0.16 
(95% CI =(-0.19, -0.13)), p < .001, std.b = -0.34 (95% CI = (-0.40, -0.28))) over the rounds. The 
back-transfer expectations decreased more for the selfish trustee than they increased for 
the generous trustee, t(59) = - 12.875, p < .001, std.b = 0.66 (95% CI = (0.56, 0.76)). This 
back-transfer expectation change was accompanied by an increase in certainty about the 
back-transfer expectations over the rounds, round number main effect: χ² (1) = 118.62, p < 
.001. The certainty did not change differently for the two trustees over the rounds, trustee x 
round number interaction: χ² (1) = 0.02, p = .879.  
Trust ratings about the generous trustee changed differently than about the selfish 
trustee over the rounds, trustee x round number interaction: χ² (1) = 147.80, p < .001. Post-
hoc tests revealed that they increased for the generous trustee (b = 0.44 (95%CI = (0.33, 




= -0.58 (95% CI = (-0.70, -0.47)), p < .001, std.b = -0.30 (95% CI = (-0.35, -0.24))) over the 
rounds. The decrease in trust ratings was larger for the selfish trustee than the increase in 
trust ratings for the generous trustee, t(59) = -10.998, p < .001, std.b = 0.64 (95% CI = (0.53, 
0.76)).  
Total earnings at the end of the trust game were larger with the generous trustee 
than with the selfish trustee, t(59) = 29.187, p < .001, std.b = 0.95 (95% CI = (0.89, 1.00)), see 
Table 1. The behavior and beliefs in the repeated trust game confirmed our hypothesis that 
subjects learned to trust the generous trustee more than the selfish trustee. Interestingly, 
the change in investments and beliefs was larger for the selfish trustee than the generous 
trustee, which can be partly attributed to biased back-transfer expectations at the beginning 
of the repeated trust game.  
Experiment 1 – Repeated trust game and interpersonal distance task associations 
To quantify the differences in interpersonal distance changes between the generous 
and selfish trustee, we explored whether individual variation in learning during the trust 
game was related to distance changes. First we explored whether total earnings, as a crude 
measure of learning in the trust game, was associated with the change in interpersonal 
distance (= after trust game – before trust game): indeed the association between distance 
change and total earnings differed significantly between the trustees (trustee x total 
earnings interaction: χ² (1) = 7.912, p = .005). Post-hoc tests revealed that higher total 
earnings with the selfish trustee were significantly associated with larger distance changes 
from the selfish trustee (b = 0.33 (95% CI = (0.08, 0.59)), p = 0.01, std.b = 1.53 (95% CI = 
(0.36, 2.69))). Total earnings with the generous trustee were not associated with distance 
change from the generous trustee (b = -0.08 (95% CI = (-0. 20, 0.05)), p = .233, std.b = -0.34 
(95% CI = (-0.91, 0.22))).  
Second, we explored whether the investment, back-transfer expectation, or trust 
rating in the final interaction with the two trustees were associated with their post-game 
distance. There was no main effect, other than a trust rating main effect (χ² (1) = 6.103, p = 
.014. There were no significant trustee type x investment interaction (χ² (1) = 2.75, p = .097) 
or trustee type x back-transfer expectation interaction (χ² (1) = 0.872, p = .350). However, 
the trustee type x trust rating interaction was significant, χ² (1) = 5.495, p = .019. Post-hoc 




post-game distance from the selfish trustee, b = -0.33 (95% CI = (-0.59, -0.07), p = .013, std.b 
= -0.59 (95% CI = (-1.05, -0.12)). The association between the trust rating of the generous 
trustee and the post-game distance from the generous trustee was not significant, b = 0.05 
(95% CI = (-0.13, 0.24)), p = .578, std.b = 0.10 (95% CI = (-0.24, 0.43)).  
As a final step, we explored whether the selfishness/ generosity of the trustees (and 
thus their back-transfers) or the trust rating of the two trustees in the final interaction were 
associated with their post-game distance. There was only a significant trustee type x trust 
rating interaction (χ² (1) = 5.226, p = .022), and no trustee type x back-transfer interaction (χ² 
(1) = 1.289, p = .256) or back-transfer main effect (χ² (1) = 0.348, p = .555). Post-hoc tests 
revealed, that higher trust ratings of the selfish trustee were associated with smaller post-
game distances from the selfish trustee, b = -0.32 (95% CI = (-0.57, -0.06), p = . 014, std.b = -
0.57 (95% CI = (-1.02, -0.12)). The trust rating of the generous trustee was not associated 
with the post-game distance from the generous trustee, b = 0.04 (95% CI = (-0.14, 0.22), p = . 
646, std.b = 0.08 (95% CI = (-0.25, 0.40)). 
 
Experiment 2 - Repeated trust game 
 Learning in the repeated trust game was similar as in experiment 1 and is described 
in the supplementary results, the supplementary results Table 5, as well as the 
supplementary results Figure 1B. Here we only highlight the different findings. First, the 
certainty about the back-transfer expectations changed differently for the two trustees over 
the rounds (trustee x round number interaction: χ²(1) = 5.51, p = .019). Post-hoc tests 
revealed that the increase in certainty was marginally steeper for the selfish trustee (b = 
0.73, 95% CI = (0.55, 0.91), p < .001, std.b = 0.35 (95% CI = (0.27, 0.44))) than for the 
generous trustee (b = 0.43, 95% CI = (0.25, 0.61), p < .001, std.b = 0.21 (95% CI = (0.12, 
0.29))), t(56) = 1.908, p = .06, std.b = -0.17 (95% CI = (-0.34, 0.00)). Second, the association 
between total earnings and distance change did not significantly differ for the two trustees 
(earnings x trustee interaction: χ²(1) = 0.10, p = .756). As in experiment 1, there was also no 
main effect of earnings on distance change, χ²(1) = 0.73, p = .393. Third, when exploring 
whether the investment, back-transfer expectation, or trust rating in the final interaction 
with the two trustees were associated with their post-game distance, there was only a 




(all other p > .37). Here, post-game distances decreased with increasing trust ratings, 
independent of trustee type. Finally, when exploring whether the generosity/ selfishness of 
the trustees or the trust ratings during the final interaction were associated with the post-
game distance, there was only a trust rating main effect (χ²(1) = 8.924, p = .003), but no 
interactions (all other p > .53). Here, higher trust ratings were associated with a smaller 
distance from the trustees. 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, we demonstrate that trust in interaction partners—developed 
during a repeated trust game—modulates both reflective and reflexive interpersonal 
distance preferences. While interactions with a selfish trustee increased interpersonal 
distance, those with a generous trustee did not significantly decrease distance preferences. 
These preferences are not caused by learning differences in the repeated trust game, as 
subjects correctly adapted their behavior and beliefs by increasing their investments, back-
transfer expectations, and experienced trust to the generous trustee, and decreasing them 
to the selfish trustee as the task progressed. Rather, the distances after the trust game were 
associated with how much the subjects trusted the interaction partners during their final 
interaction in the trust game. For the reflective interpersonal distance this was specific to 
the selfish trustee, whereas for the reflexive interpersonal distance there was a general 
association for both trustees. Interestingly, in both experiments, subjects were biased at the 
beginning of the repeated trust game as they made high investments and were expecting 
high back-transfers of both trustees. These overly optimistic expectations were violated by 
the selfish trustee which resulted in larger changes in investments and beliefs for the selfish 
than the generous trustee. These expectation violations might have put more attention on 
the selfish than the generous trustee and might have brought about the greater change in 
interpersonal distance to the selfish trustee. 
 Another reason the change in interpersonal distance might have been more 
pronounced for the selfish than for the generous trustee may be because the selfish (vs 
generous) trustee’s behavior was more salient in the repeated trust game. Negative 
feedback, but specifically non-cooperative behavior (e.g., low back-transfers), draw more 




cooperative behavior (e.g., high back-transfers) (Rankin & Eggimann, 2009; Vanneste, 
Verplaetse, Vanhiel, & Braeckman, 2007). While high expectations at the beginning of a 
decision-making task are a general phenomenon (Branas-Garza, Rodriguez-Lara, & Sanchez, 
2017), the selfish trustee violated them continuously by making low back-transfers. The non-
cooperative behavior and expectation violations might have made more salient the selfish 
(vs generous) trustee’s behavior, resulting in a more pronounced adjustment in 
interpersonal distance preferences. 
 The salience of the selfish trustee mirrors saliency of negative decision-makers when 
inferring their moral character (Siegel, Mathys, Rutledge, & Crockett, 2018). Interestingly, 
belief formation about bad moral behavior is characterized by a higher level of uncertainty 
than good moral behavior. This finding contrasts with our results where certainty about 
back-transfer expectations were similar for the generous and selfish trustee in experiment 1, 
and higher for the selfish than the generous trustee in experiment 2. A reason for these 
different results might lie in differences in the decision outcome about which subjects had to 
form beliefs: while subjects in our study actually received the back-transfers about which 
they formed beliefs, subjects in Siegel et al.´s study formed beliefs about a behavior that did 
not affect them (i.e. the moral character of a decision-maker giving electric shocks to a third 
person). Thus, while we both show that negatively perceived people appear to be more 
salient than positively perceived people during belief formation, the certainty about these 
beliefs might depend on whether these people’s behavior can directly impact the subject. 
 At the beginning of the trust game in both experiments, subjects displayed overly 
optimistic expectations about the interaction partners’ back-transfers. These expectations 
might indicate that the subjects started out the task in a trust mindset. With a trust mindset, 
specific mental representations that are in that moment highly accessible can influence 
behaviour and decisions, such as priming effects (Kleiman, Sher, Elster, & Mayo, 2015; Mayo, 
2015). With this trust mindset, subjects in the present study might have been receptive to 
the trust game manipulation and therefore adjusted their subsequent interpersonal 
distance. In contrast, with a distrust mindset, alternatives are considered to specific mental 
representations, which decreases, or even blocks the influence of the highly accessible 
mental representations on the current behaviour and decisions (Kleiman et al., 2015; Mayo, 




to distrust. Specifically, we found that interactions with the selfish trustee increased distance 
preferences. However, with a distrust mindset, the influence of interacting with a selfish 
trustee on distance preferences should have been diminished. This discrepancy between our 
findings and the distrust mindset´s prediction might indicate that the subjects had a trust 
mindset throughout the experiment.   
We demonstrate that the trust learned during the repeated trust game generalizes 
beyond monetary exchanges and influences subsequent imagined interactions in a different 
context with the same partner. Specifically, the experienced trust—but not the monetary 
aspects of the trust game (i.e., the investments, the back-transfers from the trustee, nor the 
back-transfer expectations)—were associated with distance preferences after the trust 
game. Our study validates findings from Hale, Payne, Taylor, Paoletti, and Hamilton (2018) 
who have suggested, but could not unequivocally demonstrate, that interactions with a fair 
and unfair trustee during a repeated trust game impacted how much of their advice was 
followed in navigating a subsequent virtual maze task. In their virtual reality study, almost 
half of the subjects based their decision to follow advice on the character of the voice of the 
trustee. The other half of the subjects reported that they based their decision to follow 
advice on the perceived fairness of the trustee during the trust game. This second half of the 
subjects followed the advice of the fair (vs unfair) trustee more. However, this effect was not 
present in the group that was guided by the character of the trustee´s voice. By limiting the 
source of information to one (i.e., the back-transfer behavior during the trust game), we 
validated Hale et al.´s finding in a larger sample. In addition, our study suggests that Hale et 
al.´s findings might be attributable to the subjectively experienced fairness of the trustees, 
and not solely the monetary interactions during the trust game.  
The trust learned during the repeated trust game only changed interpersonal 
distance to the trustees, and did not affect distance preferences to imagined approaching 
people unrelated to the trust game. Negative social experiences with the selfish trustee did 
not generalize to affect interpersonal distance preferences with other approaching people. 
For example, it neither made subjects more cautious—by increasing interpersonal distance 
to all of the approaching people—nor did it increase affiliative behavior with close others 
(Loseth, Ellingsen, & Leknes, 2014)—by decreasing interpersonal distance after the trust 




interaction partners of the trust game. These are important notions for the specificity of our 
manipulation as well as for the external validity of our study, as trusting a person in everyday 
life is not confined to a specific situation and typically does not extend to unrelated others.  
We have demonstrated that both reflective and reflexive interpersonal distance 
preferences change when we distrust an interaction partner. This finding is in line with work 
on peripersonal, as well as reflective and reflexive interpersonal distance adaptations to 
interaction partners of different age and gender (Iachini et al., 2016). Interestingly, in our 
reflective interpersonal distance task, total earnings and experienced trust were specifically 
associated with the change in interpersonal distance to the selfish trustee. Opposite to that, 
in the reflexive interpersonal distance task, experienced trust was generally associated with 
the distance after the trust game in both trustees, and not at all with total earnings. These 
effects hint at possible differential mechanisms underlying the reflective and reflexive 
measures. Future studies with a well-matched non-social trust game control task are needed 
to exclude the possibility that our findings are driven by changes in risk-aversion instead of 
trust. For now, we can only conclude that the distrust in the selfish trustee was so strong 
that it not only affected the conscious deliberative aspect of interpersonal distance, but also 
the more automatic, reflexive aspect. 
The increase in interpersonal distance to the selfish trustee might be due to a change 
in the subject’s personal space caused by the interactions with the selfish trustee. Personal 
space is theorized to serve as a buffer-zone protecting against harms or threats (Dosey & 
Meisels, 1969), and extends when interacting with unfavourable others (Iachini et al., 2015; 
Pellencin et al., 2018; Teneggi, Canzoneri, di Pellegrino, & Serino, 2013). As the permeability 
of this personal space is thought to depend on the trustworthiness of the interaction partner 
(Scott, 1993), the selfish trustee might have intruded the subject’s extending personal space. 
Such an intrusion is associated with physiological arousal (Sawada, 2003), which might be 
related to increased stress (Dosey & Meisels, 1969) and anxiety (Perry et al., 2013; Rogers, 
Rearden, & Hillner, 1981). Because an intrusion of personal space triggers a withdrawal 
reaction (Hayduk, 1983; Sundstrom & Altman, 1976), the increase in interpersonal distance 
from the selfish trustee might be a way to relieve this physiological and emotional 
discomfort. Future research has yet to establish whether a change in trust affects the size of 




A consequence of an increased physical distance from negative interaction partners 
might be that the psychological distance increases as well, as communication becomes more 
impersonal (Jourard & Friedman, 1970; Skotko & Langmeyer, 1977), and empathising 
behaviour potentially decreases (Perry et al., 2014; Strayer & Roberts, 1997). Relatedly, 
increasing spatial distance might have a similar function to decreasing similarity, which has a 
negative impact on empathy and prosocial behaviour as well (e.g. Majdandzic, Amashaufer, 
Hummer, Windischberger, & Lamm, 2016). An increased distance might be necessary for 
successful outcomes with a negative interaction partner (Burgoon, Stacks, & Woodall, 1979), 
potentially preventing a break-down of the interaction (King-Casas et al., 2008). Future 
research has to establish whether the success of an interaction with a distrusted interaction 
partner in different contexts (such as collaboration, or competition) depend on the 
interpersonal distances from them. 
  In conclusion, we have established that developing distrust in a person behaving in a 
consistently selfish manner during a repeated trust game affects subsequent reflective, as 
well as reflexive interpersonal distance towards them. These findings extend our current 
understanding of trust and interpersonal distance, such that interpersonal distance does not 
only influence levels of trust (Bryan et al., 2012), but trust also impacts interpersonal 
distance. Furthermore, our results are a starting point to deepen our understanding of how 
we successfully navigate interactions with distrusted others without a breakdown or 
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Supplementary Table 1.  
Descriptives of distance measured during paper & pencil interpersonal distance task and test statistics  
of distance change due to trust game 






   
 t-statistic p-value 
(corrected) 
std. b 
Friend 0.09 (0.05) 0.09 (0.05) 0.012 > .999 -0.00 
Mother 0.15 (0.20) 0.15 (0.20) 0.160  > .999 -0.01 
Unknown person 0.29 (0.18) 0.32 (0.22) -1.037  .917 0.07 
Father 0.21 (0.27) 0.19 (0.26) 0.424 .999 -0.03 
Experimenter 0.22 (0.15) 0.20 (0.14) 0.640 .994 -0.05 
Selfish trustee 0.25 (0.16) 0.37 (0.26) -4.376 <.001 0.31 
Generous trustee 0.24 (0.14) 0.19 (0.10) 1.792 .413 -0.13 
 
Supplementary Table 2. 
Test statistics of distance measured during paper & pencil interpersonal distance task comparing 









Before trust game      
Selfish trustee -      
 Generous trustee 0.004 (0.029)  667   0.132   1.0000 -0.01 
 Friend 0.155 (0.029)  667   5.415   <.0001 -0.27 
 Mother 0.092 (0.029)  667   3.213   0.0458 -0.16 
 Father 0.037 (0.029)  667 1.291   0.9790 -0.07 
 Unknown person -0.048 
(0.029)  
667 -1.662   0.8706 0.08 
 Experimenter 0.026 (0.029)  667   0.916   0.9991 -0.05 
Generous trustee -      
 Friend -0.151 
(0.029)  
667 -5.283   <.0001 -0.27 
 Mother 0.088 (0.029)  667 3.081   0.0681 -0.16 
 Father 0.033 (0.029)  667   1.160   0.9916 -0.06 
 Unknown person -0.051 
(0.029) 
667 -1.794   0.7987 0.09 
 Experimenter 0.022 (0.029)  667   0.784   0.9998 -0.04 
After trust game      
Selfish trustee -       
 Generous trustee 0.178 (0.028)   667 6.405   <.0001 -0.31 
 Friend 0.279 (0.028)  667 10.033   <.0001 -0.49 
 Mother 0.220 (0.028)  667 7.916   <.0001 -0.39 
 Father 0.173 (0.028)  667 6.217   <.0001 -0.30 
 Unknown person 0.047 (0.028)  667 1.683   0.8602 -0.08 
 Experimenter 0.168 (0.028)  667 6.040   <.0001 -0.30 




 Friend -0.101 
(0.028)  
667 -3.627   0.0114 -0.18 
 Mother 0.042 (0.028)  667   1.511   0.9308 -0.07 
 Father -0.005 
(0.028)  
667 -0.188   1.0000 0.01 
 Unknown person -0.131 
(0.028)  
667 -4.722   0.0001 0.23 
 Experimenter -0.010 
(0.028)  
667 -0.365   1.0000 0.02 
 
Experiment 2 
Supplementary Table 3.  
Descriptives of distance measured during digital interpersonal distance task and test statistics  of 
distance change due to trust game 






   
 t-statistic p-value 
(corrected) 
Std. b 
Friend 0.10 (0.12) 0.08 (0.06) 0.652  .994 -0.04 
Mother 0.13 (0.17) 0.14 (0.18) -0.417  .999 0.03 
Unknown person 0.27 (0.19) 0.29 (0.20) -0.774 .982 0.05 
Father 0.12 (0.12) 0.12 (0.15) -0.353 .999 0.02 
Experimenter 0.19 (0.12) 0.19 (0.12) -0.586 .997 0.04 
Selfish trustee 0.20 (0.19) 0.38 (0.29) -7.663 <.001 0.52 
Generous trustee 0.22 (0.16) 0.19 (0.15) 0.841 .972 -0.06 
 
Supplementary Table 4. 
Test statistics of distance measured during digital interpersonal distance task comparing distances 










Before trust game      
Selfish trustee -      
 Generous trustee -0.018 
(0.025) 
707 -0.720   0.9999 0.03 
 Friend 0.101 (0.025)  707 4.078   0.0021 -0.20 
 Mother 0.068 (0.025)  707   2.759   0.1641 -0.13 
 Father 0.081 (0.025) 707 3.284   0.0370 -0.16 
 Unknown person -0.071 
(0.025)  
707 -2.849   0.1297 0.14 
 Experimenter 0.017 (0.025) 707   0.675   1.0000 -0.03 
Generous trustee -      
 Friend -0.119 
(0.025) 
707 -4.798   0.0001 -0.23 
 Mother 0.086 (0.025)   707 3.479   0.0195 -0.17 




 Unknown person -0.053 
(0.025) 
707 -2.129   0.5586 0.10 
 Experimenter 0.035 (0.025)  707 1.394   0.9615 -0.07 
After trust game      
Selfish trustee -       
 Generous trustee 0.192 (0.025) 707 7.831   <.0001 -0.37 
 Friend 0.306 (0.025)  707 12.482   <.0001 -0.59 
 Mother 0.247 (0.025)  707 10.075   <.0001 -0.48 
 Father 0.262 (0.025)  707 10.669   <.0001 -0.51 
 Unknown person 0.099 (0.025)   707 4.057   0.0021 -0.19 
 Experimenter 0.191 (0.025)   707 7.801   <.0001 -0.37 
Generous trustee -       
 Friend -0.114 
(0.025)  
707 -4.651   0.0001 -0.22 
 Mother 0.055 (0.025)  707   2.244   0.4713 -0.11 
 Father 0.070 (0.025)  707   2.838   0.1337 -0.13 
 Unknown person -0.093 
(0.025)  
707 -3.774   0.0066 0.18 
 Experimenter -0.001 
(0.025)  
707 -0.030   1.0000 0.00 
 
Repeated Trust Game 
In experiment 2, subjects learned successfully to differentiate between the generous and selfish 
trustee during the repeated trust game. They changed their investments in a different manner for 
the two trustees over the rounds, interaction trustee x period: χ²(1) = 665.272, p < .001. 
Decomposing this interaction, the investments to the generous trustee increased over the rounds, b 
= 0.05 (95% CI = (0.04, 0.06)), p < .001, std.b = 0.19 (95% CI = (0.17, 0.22)), and decreased to the 
selfish trustee, b = -0.08 (95% CI = (-0.09, -0.07)), p < .001, std.b = -0.31 (95% CI = (-0.34, -0.28)). In 
addition, subjects changed their trust ratings about the two trustees in a different manner of the 
rounds, interaction trustee x period: χ² (1) = 107.948, p < .001. Decomposing this interaction, trust 
ratings about the generous trustee increased over the rounds, b = 0.36 (95%CI = (0.24, 0.49)), p < 
.001, std.b = 0.17 (95% CI = (0.11, 0.23)), and decreased with the selfish trustee, b = -0.57 (95% CI = (-
0.69, -0.44)), p < .001, std.b = -0.27 (95% CI = (-0.33, -0.21)). Back-transfer expectations about the 
two trustees also changed in a different manner over the rounds, trustee x period interaction: χ²(1) = 
135.665, p < 0.001. Post-hoc tests revealed that the back-transfer expectations about the generous 
trustee increased over the rounds (b  = 0.08, (95% CI = (0.05, 0.11)), p < .001, std.b = 0.18 (95% CI = 
(0.11, 0.24))), while they decreased for the selfish trustee over the rounds (b = -0.17 (95% CI = (-0.20, 
-0.14)), p < .001, std.b = -0.38 (95% CI = (-0.44, -0.31))). 
Supplementary Table 5. 
Descriptive statistics of measures in the repeated trust game in experiment 2 






trustee selfish trustee 
generous 
trustee selfish trustee 
  m (SD) m (SD) m (SD) m (SD) 
Investment in points 6.84 (3.02) 6.98 (3.16) 8.42 (2.59) 2.42 (2.90) 
trust rating in % 54.46 (26.21) 53.11 (26.26) 70.07 (27.07) 15.82 (28.46) 
back-transfer expectation in % 12.28 (7.42) 12.51 (7.37) 14.89 (5.61) 2.09 (3.07) 
difference (BT exp. – BT) in % 5.44 (5.03) 5.53 (4.76) -0.11 (4.83) 0.23 (2.56) 
certainty about BT exp. in % 36.56 (26.35) 32.79 (26.35) 62.67 (30.77) 71.89 (38.34) 
total earnings in points   405.28 (37.47) 242.93 (15.07) 
Note on abbreviations: m = mean, SD = standard deviation, BT = back-transfer, BT exp. = back-transfer expectations 
 
As in the first experiment, subjects displayed a bias in their trust game behavior. During the 
first interaction with the generous and selfish trustee, their back-transfer expectations did not match 
the actual back-transfers from the two trustees (tselfish(56) = -8.77, p < .001, d = -1.082; tgenerous(56) = -
8.16, p < .001, d = -1.162). As can be seen in the supplementary Table 3, the decrease in investments 
with the selfish trustee was larger than the increase in investments with the generous trustee, t(56) = 
-12.58, p < .001, std.b = 0.66 (95% CI = (0.55, 0.76)). In addition, the decrease in back-transfer 
expectations was larger with the selfish trustee than the increase with the generous trustee, t(56) = -
13.94, p < .001, std.b = 0.62 (95% CI = (0.54, 0.71)). Finally, the decrease in trust ratings was also 
larger in the selfish trustee, than the increase with the generous trustee, t(56) = -11.66, p < .001, 
std.b = 0.66 (95% CI = (0.55, 0.77)). Total earnings were larger for the generous trustee than the 
selfish trustee, t(56) = 29.85, p < .001, std.b = -0.94 (95% CI = (-1.01, -0.88)). 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Trust and static interpersonal distance adaptation in experiment 2. A) 
Subjects increased their distance to the selfish trustee after the repeated trust game (RTG) in the 
interpersonal distance task. Dots represent individual data points, error bars are 95% confidence 




increased their investments to the generous trustee (solid line) and decreased them to the selfish 
trustee (dashed line) during 26 interactions with each trustee in the repeated trust game. Group data 









Supplementary Table 6. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing relative distance in experiment 1 on 





Supplementary Table 7. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing relative distance in experiment 2 on 






Supplementary Table 8. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing investment in experiment 1 on trustee 
type, round number, and their interaction. 
  intercept trustee 1 round nr 
trustee 1 0.057 
  round nr -0.332 0 
 t1:round nr 0 -0.463 -0.001 
 
Supplementary Table 9. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing back-transfer expectation in experiment 1 
on trustee type, round number, and their interaction. 
  intercept round nr trustee 1 
round nr -0.497 
  trustee 1 -0.259 0.001 
 round nr:t1 0 -0.001 -0.687 
 
Supplementary Table 10. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing certainty about back-transfer expectation 
in experiment 1 on trustee type, round number, and their interaction. 
  intercept round nr trustee 1 
round nr -0.538 
  trustee 1 0.124 0.001 
 round nr:t1 0 -0.001 -0.793 
 
Supplementary Table 11. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing trust ratings in experiment 1 on trustee 
type, round number, and their interaction. 
  intercept round nr trustee 1 
round nr -0.502 
  trustee 1 -0.05 0 
 round nr:t1 0 -0.001 -0.63 
 
Supplementary Table 12. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing change in interpersonal distance in 
experiment 1 on trustee type, total earnings, and their interaction. 
  intercept total earnings trustee 1 
total earnings -0.967 
  trustee 1 0.186 -0.417 





Supplementary Table 13. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of linear mixed model regressing post trust game interpersonal 
distance in experiment 1 on trustee type, investment, trust rating, back-transfer expectation, and 
their interactions of the final two rounds of the trust game.  
 












      investment -0.422 0.319 
     back-transfer 
expectation 0.063 -0.113 -0.725 
    trust rating -0.162 0.192 -0.452 0.159 
   trustee1: investment 0.223 -0.379 0.156 -0.265 -0.373 
  trustee1: back-transfer 
expectation -0.056 0 -0.337 0.663 0.268 -0.677 
 trustee1: trust rating 0.225 -0.204 -0.348 0.201 0.312 -0.505 0.157 
 
Supplementary Table 14. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing post trust game interpersonal distance in 
experiment 1 on trustee type, back-transfer, trust rating, and their interaction of the final two rounds 
of the trust game. 
  




    back-transfer -0.426 -0.179 
   trust rating -0.089 0.322 -0.611 
  trustee1: back-transfer -0.247 -0.381 0.942 -0.53 
 trustee1: trust rating 0.358 -0.127 -0.582 0.319 -0.649 
 
Supplementary Table 15. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing investment in experiment 2 on trustee 
type, round number, and their interaction. 
  intercept trustee 1 round nr 
trustee 1 0.162 
  round nr -0.259 -0.001 
 t1:round nr -0.001 -0.415 0.002 
 
Supplementary Table 16. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing back-transfer expectation in experiment 2 
on trustee type, round number, and their interaction. 
  intercept round nr trustee 1 





trustee 1 -0.05 -0.004 
 round nr:t1 -0.003 0.004 -0.697 
 
Supplementary Table 17. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing certainty about back-transfer expectation 
in experiment 2 on trustee type, round number, and their interaction. 
  intercept round nr trustee 1 
round nr -0.573 
  trustee 1 0.195 -0.004 
 round nr:t1 -0.003 0.004 -0.764 
 
Supplementary Table 18. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing trust ratings in experiment 2 on trustee 
type, round number, and their interaction. 
  intercept round nr trustee 1 
round nr -0.44 
  trustee 1 0.003 -0.003 
 round nr:t1 -0.002 0.004 -0.594 
 
Supplementary Table 19. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing change in interpersonal distance in 
experiment 2 on trustee type, total earnings, and their interaction. 
  intercept total earnings trustee 1 
total 
earnings -0.973 
  trustee 1 0.35 -0.543 
 te:t1 -0.539 0.708 -0.976 
 
Supplementary Table 20. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of linear mixed model regressing post trust game interpersonal 
distance in experiment 2 on trustee type, investment, trust rating, back-transfer expectation, and 
their interactions of the final two rounds of the trust game. 
  












      investment -0.473 0.353 
     back-transfer 
expectation 0.103 -0.117 -0.679 
    trust rating -0.293 0.216 0.101 -0.456 
   trustee1: 






transfer expectation 0.044 -0.138 -0.109 0.396 -0.026 -0.408 
 trustee1: trust 
rating 0.182 -0.248 0.062 -0.222 0.03 -0.137 -0.377 
 
Supplementary Table 21. 
Inter-variable correlation matrix of mixed model regressing post trust game interpersonal distance in 
experiment 2 on trustee type, back-transfer, trust rating, and their interaction of the final two rounds 










    back-transfer -0.3 -0.023 
   trust rating -0.347 0.251 -0.371 
  trustee1: back-transfer 0.018 -0.419 0.735 -0.094 
 trustee1: trust rating 0.252 -0.343 -0.188 -0.062 -0.376 
 
 
